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Abstract
Weak paternalism commits prot´ eg´ es to their own plans. This experiment ad-
dresses the question of whether prot´ eg´ es judge weakly paternalistic acts primarily
by means of their consequences or on principle grounds. Subjects receive a reward
for showing up to the laboratory early the next morning which decreases in time.
Prot´ eg´ es can either self-commit to a planned time or self-liberate by preserving
spontaneity. By making this binary choice prot´ eg´ es express their preference re-
garding liberty. Simultaneously, another subject is either paternalistic or liberal by
making an analogous choice for them. We analyze prot´ eg´ es’ attitudes toward both
policy styles via costly reward choices. If only consequences matter, self-committers
should appreciate paternalism while self-liberators should condemn it. A deonto-
logical aversion against paternalism would negate a diﬀerence between both groups.
Diﬀering judgments constitute a consequentialist pattern. However, this pattern is
driven by self-liberators’ clear judgments. For self-committers also a norm of non-
interference into others’ liberty can be identiﬁed.
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judgments
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Personal experience as well as anecdotes (as can be found in Elster 2000) suggest
that people, for instance, place their alarm clock beyond reach to get out of bed or
self-restrict their liquidity to prevent excessive shopping. In strategies of rational
self-management (see Schelling 1978, 1984) they are willing to commit their own
future selves. If these people were pure consequentialists, it should not matter to
them whether someone else would, for instance, put the alarm clock out of reach
or restrict their liquidity temporarily. However, such forms of weak paternalism
may be problematic not only from the external point of view of economists and
philosophers but possibly from the point of view of those who would be perfectly
willing to self-commit. This issue has been unduly neglected so far in the rather
broad discussion on commitment on the one hand and paternalism on the other
hand.
By means of an incentivized economic experiment this article addresses the
question if it makes a diﬀerence whether commitments are self-imposed or other-
imposed. To that eﬀect, it is in particular scrutinized whether prot´ eg´ es’ willingness
to self-restrict their freedom of choice predicts their attitudes toward weak pater-
nalism.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section we
will give an overview over its background formed by theoretical considerations and
the experimental literature concerning related issues. Section three describes the
experimental design, hypotheses are derived in section four. Section ﬁve discusses
the experimental results while the sixth section concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical Background
There are two strands of argument to be taken into account here: Firstly, the
literature on self-commitment, and, secondly, the literature on paternalism. The
ﬁrst being chieﬂy from economics the second from philosophy.
In a seminal article Strotz (1955) discusses self-commitment as the method that
a rational weak-willed decision-maker will use to stick to her plan and overcome
her anticipated time-inconsistency.1 Alternative formulations of the problem have
1In “A Treatise of Human Nature” this time-inconsistency has been ingeniously described by Hume
(2010): “In reﬂecting on any action, which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always resolve
to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be more contiguous or remote; nor does any
diﬀerence in that particular make a diﬀerence in my present intentions and resolutions. My distance
from the ﬁnal determination makes all those minute diﬀerences vanish, nor am I aﬀected by any thing,
but the general and more discernable qualities of good and evil. But on my nearer approach, those
2
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Pesendorfer 2001, Fudenberg and Levine 2006). If a decision-maker is expected
either to lack this “sophistication” (Hammond 1976) or has no self-commitment
devices at her disposal, others may decide to act on her behalf and interest. This
infringes on her autonomy and leads to issues of paternalism (see, for instance,
Thaler and Sunstein 1993, 2008, Glaeser 2006, Scoccia 2008).
Dworkin (2005) deﬁnes paternalism as follows: “[...] X acts paternalistically
towards Y by doing (omitting) Z:
1. Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y.
2. X does so without the consent of Y.
3. X does so just because Z will improve the welfare of Y (where this includes
preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the interests,
values, or good of Y.”
He emphasizes that the second condition has to be read as distinct from acting
against the consent of the prot´ eg´ e. She may in fact consent but this may not be
known to the paternalist. Furthermore, we will focus on what Dworkin (2005) calls
weak paternalism as opposed to strong paternalism:
“A weak paternalist believes that it is legitimate to interfere with the
means that agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely
to defeat those ends. [...] A strong paternalist believes that people may
be mistaken or confused about their ends and it is legitimate to interfere
to prevent them from achieving those ends. [...] Another way of putting
this: we may interfere with mistakes about the facts but not mistakes
about values.”
According to the ﬁrst criterion, paternalism is characterized by the interference
of a patron with the liberty or autonomy of the prot´ eg´ e. A weak paternalist takes
the prot´ eg´ e’s ends for granted and commits her to her self-determined plan. Tech-
nically, commitment restricts the prot´ eg´ e’s future choice set and therefore limits
her spontaneity. A weak paternalist will assure that her prot´ eg´ e does not spoil her
own plan by succumbing to temptations on the way. For one whose end it is to
maximize her lifespan but who is too lazy to fasten the seatbelt, mandatory seatbelt
wearing is only weakly paternalistic. One is committed to safety.
circumstances, which I at ﬁrst over-look’d, begin to appear, and have an inﬂuence on my conduct and
aﬀections. A new inclination to the present good springs up, and makes it diﬃcult for me to adhere
inﬂexibly to my ﬁrst purpose and resolution. This natural inﬁrmity I may very much regret, and I may
endeavour, by all possible means, to free my self from it. I may have recourse to study and reﬂexion
within myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation, and repeated resolution: And having
experienc’d how ineﬀectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient, by which I
may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness.”
3
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fulﬁlls the same goal as self-commitment. It commits a decision-maker to a plan
that she has chosen by herself at one point in time. A weak paternalist helps the
decision-maker to pursue this plan, even though the former may not necessarily
agree with the ends incorporated in this plan.
The question of agency that we raise should be isolated from the discussion on
the intrinsic value of freedom of choice claiming that freedom has a value beyond
being a means to achieve other ends (see, for instance, Arrow 1995).2 Several
attempts to measure this intrinsic value have been proposed (see Sen 1988, Sugden
1998, 2001, Bavetta and Guala 2003). Our investigation focuses on a diﬀerent
problem. A self-committer has already opted against freedom of choice at some
future time despite its instrumental and intrinsic value and may still refute other-
imposed commitment.
2.2 Experimental Background
Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) conducted an artiﬁcial ﬁeld experiment that gave
students the opportunity to set binding deadlines for handing in three course works.
The individually chosen deadlines were ambitious and actually enhanced grade-wise
performance. However, the authors compare grades of these students with those of
students in a control group who were set evenly spread deadlines by their lecturers.
The students in the control group performed better than those with self-imposed
deadlines which lets the authors conclude that self-commitment devices are used if
available but used ineﬀectively.
Ashraf et al. (2006) designed a commitment savings product for a Philippine
bank. The product restricted the bank customers access to their savings and was
oﬀered to a randomly chosen subset of present and former clients of the bank.
Almost 30 % of clients actually chose to open the respective account.
A similar fraction of self-committers could be observed when a larger but later
money reward was aspired in a laboratory experiment (Casari 2009). These subjects
took the possibility to dilute or eliminate a smaller but sooner money reward which
they feared to choose instead once it was within reach.
When analyzing consumer habits of U.S. health club members, DellaVigna and
2An example for the mere instrumental value of freedom of choice in economics is given in Amador
et al. (2006). Here, for a sophisticated planner, uncertainty may outweigh the advantages of self-
commitment. The authors model the trade-oﬀ a decision-maker faces when confronted with weak will
and exogenous uncertainty at the same time. Tying Ulysses to the mast prevents him from giving in
to the Sirens but necessarily leaves him incable of reacting in a sudden storm. In an intrapersonal
principal-agent problem, the principal’s optimization is a maneuver between the Scylla of a weak-willed
agent and the Charybdis of an externally endangered agent in restraint. For Sen (1988, p. 294) “[t]he
foundational importance of freedom may well be the most far-reaching substantive problem neglected in
standard economics.”
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This expresses itself by choosing a ﬂat-fee contract or by choosing a long-term mem-
bership. Again, self-commitment turns out to be often ineﬀective. Even though
monthly members pay higher cancellation fees than one-year members, the former
stay enrolled longer. Apart from that, ﬂat-fee members pay higher prices per ex-
pected visit than pay-per-visit users given their actual average attendances. The
authors establish that consumers mispredict their own future preferences.
Although the problem of paternalism is not addressed explicitly in the aforemen-
tioned experiments, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) as well as DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier (2006) observe that subjects’ inability to predict their own future behavior
causes ineﬀective self-commitment. In Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) superior per-
formance of students with externally imposed deadlines is emphasized. Besides a
naivet´ e of weak-willed decision-makers who blindly step into the inconsistency trap
and the non-availability of self-commitment devices, ineﬀective self-commitment
may be another reason for outside intervention. Students’ attitudes towards the
paternalistic intervention were however not elicited.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Methodology
The real eﬀort was designed to be as natural and familiar as possible to subjects.
Furthermore, we aimed to maximize the likelihood of weakness of will whilst using
an ethically justiﬁable procedure. In our design subjects received the more money
the earlier they showed up to the laboratory. The design asked them to announce
a show-up time in advance. The temptation which we expected them to anticipate
was to procrastinate getting up at the cost of losing money.
The experiment consisted of two sessions that took place on two consecutive
days. In the ﬁrst session all relevant choices were collected, the second session was
only needed to provide payments. Since we used the strategy vector method (Selten
1967) to elicit prot´ eg´ es’ attitudes towards their partons’ policy style, each subject
had to make a reward choice for both possible cases. In this way, we doubled
observations and did not rely on patrons’ actual choices as we got information also
for the counterfactual case. The order of choices was the same for all subjects.
The upcoming task was not clear to subjects when they arrived to the ﬁrst
session. The invitation contained exact information about the date and the time of
the ﬁrst session. It said also that the second session would take place the morning
after but that details could not be given until the ﬁrst session. Students were
therefore supposed to register for the experiment only if they had no important
appointments before noon on the day of the second session.
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criteria (see section 2): First, if a patron chooses to commit her prot´ eg´ e, she
will actually interfere into her liberty or autonomy of decision-making. This is
done by the commitment choice which eliminates alternative options from the
prot´ eg´ e’s choice set. Second, the patron makes her policy choice without knowing
the prot´ eg´ e’s preferences concerning liberty. In particular, no information about
the self-commitment or self-liberation choice of the counterpart is provided. So,
if the patron chooses commitment, she restricts the prot´ eg´ e’s liberty without the
latter’s explicit or implicit consent. Third, prot´ eg´ es reciprocate to patrons’ choices
and this is common knowledge before the ﬁrst choice is made. For each judging
prot´ eg´ e, it is therefore clear that the patron is trying to meet her preferences in
the ﬁrst session in order to receive a reward. Common knowledge about this was
important to overrule prot´ eg´ es’ potential beliefs in patrons’ malevolent intentions.
Whatever prot´ eg´ es judge, they judge something that was done with good (although
not completely altruistic) intentions.
Finally, the paternalist does not dictate a speciﬁc goal but commit the prot´ eg´ e
to a planned time upon which she has decided by herself. Strong paternalism in
our framework would have meant to correct the prot´ eg´ e’s plan and commit her
to an earlier time slot to make her earn more money. We assume that a patron
could have been conﬁdent about the serious intention of her prot´ eg´ e to show up
in the chosen time slot. The reason is that irrespective of her own preference for
liberty the prot´ eg´ e knew that she could possibly get committed to this particular
slot by her patron . By interfering, the patron would only prevent the prot´ eg´ e from
spoiling her own plan by getting up too late which makes her a weak paternalist.
3.2 Before the First Choice
In the ﬁrst session, before instructions were distributed, subjects were asked to
answer six pre-experimental questions (see appendix 1). These questions were about
their daily habits and student life. All questions had to be answered with “yes” or
“no”. The ﬁfth question read “Are you often angry that you do not succeed to get
up as early as planned?”. It was “hidden” among others of heterogenous kind to
prevent strategic answers. Later on, subjects were informed that their counterpart
would be provided with their answer to this question. This was done to make
prot´ eg´ es aware that every patron was sensitized for the problem of weakness of
will involved in the task. Then, instructions were distributed (see appendix 2) and
subjects were asked to read the instructions carefully. Every upcoming choice was
explained extensively to subjects before the ﬁrst choice was made.
Subjects were ﬁrst matched with a counterpart. Only at the very end of the
experiment each subject was randomly assigned one of two roles, putting her coun-
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before knowing her role. We will refer to these roles as patron and prot´ eg´ e in
the following although they were called role A and role B in the instructions.3
Choices which were made in the counterfactual role were later irrelevant for sub-
jects. Patrons could not show up to the second session and accordingly only receive
a payment for the ﬁrst session. Prot´ eg´ es could also show up to the second session
and receive an additional payment. For the ﬁrst session, all subjects got a show-up
fee of 2.50 ¤ and an initial endowment. Details about this endowment will follow
soon.
3.3 The Five Choices
3.3.1 Choice 1: Time Slot
Subjects’ ﬁrst choice only applied in case of ending up as a prot´ eg´ e. They were
asked to choose a time slot ti, where i = {1,2,...,10}, in which they would like
to show up for the second session to collect their payment. Relevant was the time
when crossing the door sill to the computer lab measured by a radio-controlled
clock. Rewards were linearly decreasing according to the time reward scheme in
table 1.
time slot earliest arrival (a.m.) latest arrival (a.m.) reward (¤)
t1 6.00 6.15 17.50
t2 6.15 6.30 16.00
t3 6.30 6.45 14.50
t4 6.45 7.00 13.00
t5 7.00 7.15 11.50
t6 7.15 7.30 10.00
t7 7.30 7.45 8.50
t8 7.45 8.00 7.00
t9 8.00 8.15 5.50
t10 8.15 9.00 4.00
Table 1: Time Reward Scheme
Subjects chose a time slot under the consideration that they could not come at
an earlier time slot than the one they had picked. More precisely, they could come
earlier, but would then have to wait till their chosen time slot started and then only
receive the reward corresponding to the chosen time slot.4
Simultaneously, each subject’s counterpart chose her own time slot.
3While the labels we introduce here are descriptive, we used neutral ones in the instructions to avoid
emotional connotations caused by mere names.
4As will become clear later, this was done to prevent that subjects in favor of liberty would simply
choose the ﬁnal time slot, thus keeping full ﬂexibility whilst preventing paternalistic commitment.
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Subjects’ second choice also applied only in case of ending up as a prot´ eg´ e. Each
one decided for herself between two alternatives. The two alternatives were liberty
and commitment.
Liberty meant that the prot´ eg´ e could decide spontaneously tomorrow morning
to come to the chosen time slot or to any later time slot which she would then prefer.
If coming later, the prot´ eg´ e would of course only get the reward corresponding to
the time slot in which she would actually show up.
Commitment meant that the prot´ eg´ e could only come to the chosen time slot.
If showing up later she would not receive anything. This was the case for all but the
ﬁnal time slot since then coming later was not possible anyway. It was emphasized
that apart from forgoing the reward not showing up to the second session would
not have any negative consequences for a prot´ eg´ e as an exclusion from further
experiments and the like.
Simultaneously, subjects’ counterparts made an analogous choice for the case
of ending up as a prot´ eg´ e. Since subjects choosing as prot´ eg´ e made their choices
between the two alternatives for themselves we will refer to them as self-commitment
and self-liberation.
3.3.3 Choice 3: Liberal or Paternalistic
The third choice was the only choice which would become relevant in case of being
assigned the role of a patron in the end. Subjects decided between liberty and
commitment for their counterpart.
Liberty again meant that the prot´ eg´ e could come spontaneously tomorrow morn-
ing to the chosen time slot or to any later time slot which she would then prefer.
The prot´ eg´ e would once more only get the reward corresponding to the time slot
in which she would actually show up.
Commitment again meant that the prot´ eg´ e would not get anything if she showed
up in a later time slot than the one that she had chosen. If their counterpart had
picked the latest time slot, the subject choosing as patron was informed, since then
a choice between the two alternatives was redundant.
Simultaneously, subjects’ counterparts made an analogous choice for the case
of ending up as a patron. Since subjects choosing as patron made choices for
their counterparts we will refer to them as liberal and paternalistic. Before making
their choice, subjects were informed about their counterpart’s answer to the pre-
experimental question.
In case of ending up as a prot´ eg´ e, there were then two choices, which could
but need not coincide. The ﬁrst was the one that the prot´ eg´ e made for herself,
the second was the one that the patron made for the prot´ eg´ e. For a prot´ eg´ e her
8
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implemented with 75 % probability. Probabilities were asymmetric to render the
patron’s choice more important.
3.3.4 Choices 4 and 5: Attribution of Praise or Blame
The last two choices concerned our variable of interest and applied only in case
of ending up as a prot´ eg´ e. Our aim was to investigate the attitudes of prot´ eg´ es
towards their patrons’ policy style via the attribution of praise or blame. Since the
elicitation of attitudes is crucial to answer our research question, special emphasis
was given on making the respective choices substantial. Therefore, prot´ eg´ es’ choices
had payoﬀ consequences for their patrons as well as themselves.
Prot´ eg´ es were endowed with 0.50 ¤ and patrons with 5.00 ¤. Prot´ eg´ es could
vary their patron’s endowment by increasing or reducing it. In either direction this
could happen in steps of 0.50 ¤, up to a maximum variation of 2.50 ¤, by paying
0.10 ¤ of their own endowment for each step. Of course, they could also leave it
unchanged which did not cause any costs. The patron’s payment did not depend
on anything else but this choice of the prot´ eg´ e. All (positive and negative) policy
reward possibilities can be seen in table 2.
patron initially (¤) variation (¤) patron new (¤) costs (¤)
5.00 + 2.50 7.50 0.50
5.00 + 2.00 7.00 0.40
5.00 + 1.50 6.50 0.30
5.00 + 1.00 6.00 0.20
5.00 + 0.50 5.50 0.10
5.00 +/- 0.00 5.00 0.00
5.00 - 0.50 4.50 0.10
5.00 - 1.00 4.00 0.20
5.00 - 1.50 3.50 0.30
5.00 - 2.00 3.00 0.40
5.00 - 2.50 2.50 0.50
Table 2: Policy Reward Scheme
Subjects had to make a choice for both possible cases: ending up as a prot´ eg´ e
and facing a liberal patron and ending up as a prot´ eg´ e and facing a paternalistic
patron.
3.4 After the Last Choice
After all choices were made, a random mechanism assigned half of the subjects the
role of a prot´ eg´ e and the other half the role of a patron. For prot´ eg´ es a second ran-
9
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choice was implemented. All subjects were then informed about their role. Patrons
were informed about the reward choice of their prot´ eg´ e for the case that actually
applied to them and about their ﬁnal payment. Prot´ eg´ es were informed about their
patrons choice and the result of the random draw which determined whether their
patron’s or their own choice was relevant. The program then stated when to show
up to the second session and under which conditions. Finally, they were informed
about their payment for the ﬁrst session depending on their reward choice given the
decision of their patron. Payments for the ﬁrst session were then made in private.
In the second session prot´ eg´ es arrived to collect their payment. When prot´ eg´ es
showed up it was checked whether they had been committed to an earlier time slot
in which case they received no payment. If they were too early they had to wait
till the beginning of their chosen time slot. Otherwise they received their payment.
4 Hypotheses
We classify subjects according to their liberty-or-commitment choice. Prot´ eg´ es are
either self-committers or self-liberators. Furthermore, we call those patrons who
chose commitment for their prot´ eg´ e paternalists, and those who chose liberty for
their prot´ eg´ e liberals.
Table 3 shows the four matching constellations which are possible to occur.
The rows specify the choice of the prot´ eg´ e for herself while the columns specify her
patron’s choice, i.e., her policy style. Self-committers could either face a paternalist





Table 3: Possible Matching Constellations
Table 3 makes clear that we will have to investigate our research question in two
dimensions. First, we can compare rewards for each policy style between the group
of self-committers and the group of self-liberators. This takes a macroperspective
since it seeks for a consequentialist pattern by looking at prot´ eg´ es as a whole. The
question it answers is passive: “How are paternalists (liberals) judged?” This is
addressed by Hypotheses 1 and 2.
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liberators.
Hypothesis 2: Liberals are rewarded more by self-liberators than by self-com-
mitters.
If paternalists are judged consequentially, they will be rewarded depending on
the consequences of the commitment they executed. Whether prot´ eg´ es consider
these consequences positively or negatively can be infered from their choice con-
cerning self-commitment or self-liberation. In terms of consequences, paternalists
should be favored by self-committers relative to self-liberators. The reverse applies
for liberals. This should reﬂect in higher rewards in cell a than cell b, and in higher
rewards in cell d than cell c.
If, on the other hand, paternalists are judged deontologically, they will be re-
warded independently of the consequences of the commitment they executed. Pa-
ternalism would be equally blamed while liberalism would be equally valued as the
appropriate policy style. Any diﬀerence in judgments for one of the two policy styles
would imply a consequentialist pattern. This means that we should observe equal
rewards in cell a and cell b. The same holds for liberals implying equal rewards in
cell c and cell d.
In addition to reward choices, we can perform a correlation check between
choices made as prot´ eg´ es and as patrons. This is what Hypothesis 3 tests for.
Hypothesis 3: Choices made as prot´ eg´ es are positively correlated with choices
made as patrons.
This is true if a consequentialist logic applies: Since positive consequences of
commitment should be more salient for subjects who self-commit in the role of a
prot´ eg´ e, they should be more likely to act paternalistically in the role of a patron.
If subjects judge deontologically, self-committers should be no more likely to exe-
cute acts of paternalistic commitment than self-liberators which negates a positive
correlation between choices.
We can now take a microperspective by comparing rewards towards the two
policy styles within the two groups of prot´ eg´ es. However, self-liberators are not
insightful here since the consequentialist as well as the deontological explanation
lead to identical predictions. This is diﬀerent for self-committers. The question
answered here is active: “How do self-committers judge?” This is addressed by
Hypothesis 4.
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berals.
If prot´ eg´ es judge consequentially, they will reward depending on the conse-
quences of the commitment imposed on them. In line with their own choice, self-
committers would favor paternalists relative to liberals and pay a “paternalism
premium”. This should reﬂect in higher rewards in cell a than cell c.
If, on the other hand, prot´ eg´ es judge deontologically, they will reward indepen-
dently of the consequences of the commitment imposed on them. Thus, liberals are
always favored compared to paternalists and a “liberalism premium” is paid. This
means that we should observe higher rewards in cell c than cell a.
From a consequentialist perspective self-liberators should reward liberalism more
than paternalism and pay a “liberalism premium”. Since the deontological expla-
nation would predict as well that self-liberators pay a “liberalism premium” the
corresponding hypothesis is omitted.
5 Results
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2010 with 190 students
from all kinds of disciplines of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany.
It was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and subjects were recruited
with the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004).
Out of 190 subjects two chose the last time slot and were excluded from the
analysis since they could not be classiﬁed as self-committers or self-liberators. Out
of the remaining 188 subjects 55 (29.3 %) chose self-commitment while 133 (70.7
%) chose self-liberation as prot´ eg´ es. This is roughly the propensity that other ex-
periments report (see section 2.2). As patrons 44 (23.7 %) chose to be paternalistic
while 142 (76.3 %) chose to be liberal.5 A comparable propensity has not been
elicited in previous experiments. An overview is given in table 4.
as prot´ eg´ e as patron
commitment 55 (29.3 %) 44 (23.7 %)
liberty 133 (70.7 %) 142 (76.3 %)
all 188 (100 %) 186 (100 %)
Table 4: Choices as Prot´ eg´ es and as Patrons
26 out of 55 (47.3 %) self-committers acted paternalistically as patron while 29
out of 55 (52.7 %) acted liberally. Compared with this, 18 out of 131 (13.7 %)
5This only sums up to 186 subjects, because from the 188 analyzed subjects two did not make a
choice as patrons since their counterparts chose the last time slot.
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liberally.
One-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests conﬁrm a signiﬁcant positive diﬀerence in
the rewarding of paternalists between self-committers and self-liberators (U =
4524.0,p = 0.0025) (see table 5). This means that paternalism is on average re-
warded more by self-committers than by self-liberators. Hypothesis 1 is thereby
supported.
mean median sd
self-committers 0.49 0.00 1.19
self-liberators -0.06 0.00 1.29
U = 4524.0 p = 0.003
Table 5: Paternalists Rewarded by Self-Committers vs. Self-Liberators
Also, a signiﬁcant positive diﬀerence in rewarding liberals between self-liberators
and self-committers can be stated (U = 2872.5,p = 0.007) (see table 6). Liberalism
is on average rewarded more by self-liberators than by self-committers. Therefore,
also Hypothesis 2 ﬁnds support.
mean median sd
self-committers 0.64 0.00 1.24
self-liberators 1.12 1.00 1.25
U = 2872.5 p = 0.007
Table 6: Liberals Rewarded by Self-Committers vs. Self-Liberators
By using a phi correlation check, we observe a moderate positive correlation
(φ = 0.36,p = 0.000) between subjects’ choices as prot´ eg´ es and as patrons. Subjects
who commit themselves are more likely to also commit others. Hypothesis 3 is
therewith supported.
Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in self-
committers’ rewards granted to paternalists and liberals (W = 57.0,p = 0.367) (see
table 7). This indicates an indiﬀerence or indecisiveness of self-committers toward
the patrons’ policy style. Given this result, Hypothesis 4 has to be refuted.
mean median sd
paternalists 0.49 0.00 1.19
liberals 0.64 0.00 1.24
W = 57.0 p = 0.367
Table 7: Self-Committers Rewarding Paternalists vs. Liberals
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If restriction of freedom is judged from a strictly consequentialist position, it should
not matter by whom it is brought about if it brings about the same desired con-
sequences. Consequentialists should agree to weak paternalism, i.e., commitment
by a patron to their own plan, if they would self-commit anyway. If, however, pa-
ternalistic acts are considered to be intrusive and refutable per se, a preference for
self-commitment does not mean that commitment by a patron need to be accepted
as well. Individuals with in a wide sense “procedural” preferences of a deontolo-
gical rather than consequentialist nature may even reject paternalism on principle
grounds, i.e., regardless of the consequences of the paternalistic act. They consider
it to be intrinsically wrong or as Kant (1991, p. 83) said, even the worst form of
despotism.
Prot´ eg´ es’ inclination to commit to a chosen plan predicts their attitudes towards
weak paternalism. They clearly value it more when willing to self-constrain their
freedom of choice than when striving for liberty. Correspondingly, liberalism is
valued more by prot´ eg´ es who self-liberate as compared to those who self-commit.
From the bird’s eye view, it seems that weak paternalism is judged consequentially.
In line with that result, subjects who self-commit in the role of a prot´ eg´ e are more
likely to act paternalistically in the role of a patron.
However, the correlation of choices made as prot´ eg´ e and as patron is not strong.
In this respect it is particularly interesting that roughly half of all self-committers
chose to paternalize their counterpart as patron while the other half decided to
act liberally. In comparison, almost nine out of ten self-liberators chose liberally.
We argue that self-committers were torn between causing consequences with salient
advantages and their adherence to a universal norm of non-interference into others’
liberty. Self-liberators were not facing a similar dilemma. The heterogeneity of
policy styles applied by self-committers indicates that consequentialist and deonto-
logical attitudes towards weak paternalism coexist.
This conclusion ﬁnds support when looking at policy judgments within the group
of self-committers. They reward paternalists clearly in absolute terms as opposed
to self-liberators who slightly punish them. On the other hand, self-committers do
not reward paternalists relative to liberals or, to put it diﬀerently, do not blame
liberals relative to paternalists, i.e., neither do they pay a “liberalism premium” nor
a “paternalism premium”. Hence, self-committers do not show a clear preference
for either one of the two policy styles. We argue that the coexistence of their
consequentialist appreciation of weak paternalism and their deontological adherence
to a norm of non-interference neutralizes, i.e., reﬂects in an equality of rewards
towards both policy styles.
Thus, it turns out that the consequentialist pattern that emerges on the macro-
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founded on purely consequentialist norms on the microlevel. The pattern is driven
by self-liberators’ plain relative dismissal of weak paternalism and their payment
of a considerable “liberalism premium”.
After all, the agency dimension is less important than the consequence dimen-
sion of weak paternalism. Prot´ eg´ es do not exhibit a strong aversion against in-
trusiveness per se as the diﬀerence in judgments between self-liberators and self-
committers suggests. The former condemn weak paternalism whereas the latter do
not mind it. To that eﬀect, it is important to stress that a substantial fraction
of subjects restricted its own future freedom when self-commitment devices were
saliently available and free. Still, also these subjects, who obviously welcome the
consequences of constraint freedom, respect a universal norm of non-interference
in that they do not explicitly reward weak paternalism. A policy-maker should
consider these aspects when balancing the provision of self-commitment devices
against outside intervention.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 055Appendix 1: Pre-experimental Questionnaire
(translated)
Please answer the following six questions truthfully with “Yes” or “No” by ticking
the respective boxes. Your data will only be analyzed for scientiﬁc reasons and
treated conﬁdentially.
Do you use a notebook computer/laptop to create your lecture notes?
( ) Yes ( ) No
Have you ever considered aborting your studies or changing your ﬁeld of studies
over frustration?
( ) Yes ( ) No
Do you read more than three books a year?
( ) Yes ( ) No
Do you live in a shared apartment?
( ) Yes ( ) No
Are you often angry that you do not manage to get up as early as planned?
( ) Yes ( ) No
Do you regularly attend football matches?
( ) Yes ( ) No
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Welcome and thanks for your participation in this experiment! Please switch oﬀ
your mobile phone and stow away any reading and writing materials. Please do not
talk to other participants since this will lead to an abortion of this session without
any payments.
This experiment consists of two sessions. This is the ﬁrst session. The second
session will take place tomorrow morning. In today’s session you will be randomly
matched with another participant. At the end of this session you will either be in
role A and the participant matched with you will be in role B or you will be in
role B and the participant matched with you will be in role A. In role A you will
have the opportunity to show up to tomorrow’s second session and earn additional
money. In this case you will receive a note with your identiﬁcation number at the
end of this session, which you are kindly asked to bring to tomorrow’s session by all
means. In role B the experiment is already over for you after today’s session. Your
role will be determined by a random draw at the end of this session. For today’s
session you receive a compensation of ¤ 2.50 as well as a role dependent initial
endowment with money. Details about this initial endowment will follow soon.
You have to make all ﬁve choices of this session before you will be informed
about your role. Eventually, the only choices of relevance are those that you have
made for the role in which you actually end up.
First Choice
You make your ﬁrst choice for the case of ending up in role A. You have to select
a time slot from a list of time slots during which you would like to show up to the
computer lab tomorrow morning to collect your payment. The entrance “Schiller-
straße” of the Goethe-Galerie (coming from the direction of the L¨ obdergraben) will
be open from 5.30 a.m. on. The crossing of the door sill to this computer lab is
decisive for the time measurement which will be carried out by us manually with
a radio-controlled clock. A list of all time slots with their corresponding payments
can be found in the following table:
When choosing your time slot please consider the following: After you have cho-
sen a time slot you can not spontaneously show up to the lab at an earlier time slot
tomorrow morning and collect the corresponding higher payment. If you choose,
for instance, the time slot from 6.30 a.m. to 6.45 a.m., and show up earlier than
6.30 a.m., you will have to wait till 6.30 a.m. and only get the respective payment
of 14.50 ¤. Furthermore, please consider that in the following it may happen that
you are also not allowed to come later. A non-appearance to tomorrow’s session
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will have no negative consequences for you, except for the fact of course that you
will receive no additional payment.
Second Choice
You make your second choice also for the case of ending up in role A. It relates
directly to the time slot you have just chosen. You have the choice between two
alternatives. Alternative 1 means that you may show up in the chosen time slot
or spontaneously in any later time slot. You always receive the amount of money
which corresponds to the time slot in which you actually show up. Alternative 2
means that you may only show up tomorrow morning in the chosen time slot. If
you show up in this time slot, you will receive the corresponding amount of money.
But if you show up in a later time slot, you will not receive any payment. In case
you choose the last time slot, you will not have to choose between the alternatives,
of course, because a later appearance is not possible anyway. Simultaneously, the
participant matched with you makes an analogous choice for himself, i.e., for the
case that she will end up in role A.
Third Choice
You make your third choice for the case of ending up in role B. You also have
to choose between the two alternatives for the participant matched with you, who
will then be in role A. Alternative 1 means that the participant matched with you
may show up in the chosen time slot or spontaneously in any later time slot. She
always receives the amount of money which corresponds to the time slot in which
she actually shows up. Alternative 2 means that she may only show up tomorrow
morning in the time slot chosen by himself. If she shows up in a later time slot,
she will not receive any payment. (If she has chosen the last time slot, you will be
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Before making your choice, you will not know how the participant matched with you
has chosen for himself. But you receive the information whether she has answered
the pre-experimental question “Are you often angry that you do not manage to get
up as early as planned?” with “yes” or with “no.” Informed with your answer to
this question, the participant matched with you makes an analogous choice for you,
i.e., for the case that she will end up in role B.
If you end up in role A later, there will be two choices between the alternatives
at hand which could apply to you. These may but need not coincide. The one which
you have made for yourself will be implemented with a 25 % probability and the one
which the participant matched with you has made for you will be implemented with
a 75 % probability. Accordingly, your choice applying to the participant matched
with you will be implemented with a 75 % probability and his own choice will be
implemented with a 25 % probability.
Fourth and Fifth Choice
You make the ﬁnal two choices again for the case of ending up in role A. You
receive an initial endowment of 0.50 ¤ and the participant matched with you, who
will then end up in role B, receives an initial endowment of 5.00 ¤. You may
now increase or decrease the initial endowment of the participant matched with
you depending on how she has chosen for you between the two alternatives. If
you would like to do that, you may higher or lower the initial endowment of the
participant matched with you in (maximally ﬁve) steps of 0.50 ¤ each by paying
0.10 ¤ of your own initial endowment for each step. According to your choice his
and your ﬁnal endowment results. The payment of the participant matched with
you, who will then be in role B, depends on nothing but this choice. If his initial
endowment shall remain unchanged, this does not cost you anything, of course. The
participant matched with you makes an analogous choice for you at the same time,
i.e., for the case that she ends up in role A. All possibilities to alter the payment of
the participant matched with you and their costs can be seen in the following two
tables. The upper one applies if you choose to increase his initial endowment, the
lower one applies if you choose to decrease his initial endowment.
Please notice that you have to make this decision before you know how the
participant matched with you has chosen for you between both alternatives. Ac-
cordingly, you have to make two choices about a potential increase or decrease of
the payment of the participant you are matched with: one for the case that she has
chosen alternative 1 for you, and one for the case that she has chosen alternative 2
for you. (If you happen to choose the last time slot, you will not have to make these
choices.) If you end up in role A, your choice about the increase or decrease that
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5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
5.00 0.50 5.50 0.10
5.00 1.00 6.00 0.20
5.00 1.50 6.50 0.30
5.00 2.00 7.00 0.40














5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
5.00 0.50 4.50 0.10
5.00 1.00 4.00 0.20
5.00 1.50 3.50 0.30
5.00 2.00 3.00 0.40
5.00 2.50 2.50 0.50
applies to the alternative that she actually chose will be implemented. This will
happen irrespective of whose choice between the alternatives the random device
eventually implements.
Please remain quiet till the experiment begins. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand. If you have read the instructions completely and understood them,
please click “OK”.
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